| Battle of Belmont |
Up close, it was Ulysses S. Grant’s first proper fight, and it was Iowa’s first hard lesson in what the war was going to cost.
The
Iowa troops at Belmont were mostly one outfit: the Seventh Iowa Infantry, a
brand-new regiment raised at Burlington. They’d drilled, marched, cursed their
blisters, and waited for the thing they’d signed up to do. Grant later admitted
that the mood in his command was boiling over. In his Personal Memoirs he
said “the officers and men were elated at the prospect of at last having the
opportunity… to fight,” and that he “did not see how I could maintain
discipline, or retain the confidence of my command, if we should return…
without an effort to do something.”
So they went.
On
November 7, 1861, Grant’s little expedition came downriver and put men ashore
above Belmont. The Seventh Iowa was in Colonel Henry Dougherty’s brigade with
the 22nd Illinois. Across the water, the Confederate guns at Columbus could see
the entire show and reach it with heavy shot. The gunboats Tyler and Lexington
worked the river to keep those big batteries busy, but everyone knew what the
Mississippi meant that morning: it was the only way home.
| Colonel Jacob G. Lauman, later a general |
They
pushed inland through broken ground and timber, meeting Confederate skirmishers
and then heavier resistance. The fighting didn’t have the tidy look of older
wars. It was smoke and shouting and half-seen men firing from the trees. At
some point, the Seventh Iowa lost that comfortable sense of a “line” and moved
the way new regiments often move—by sound, by instinct, by the tug of officers
hauling them forward.
Then,
the Union troops hit the Confederate camp.
There’s
always a moment when discipline loosens and men believe it’s already over. The
enemy camp is right there—tents, supplies, flags—everything that looks like
victory if you’ve never had victory before. Colonel Dougherty said he “heard
the cheering of the men as they entered the rebel camp,” and he noted how the
“firing of small-arms ceased for a while.” That pause mattered. It was the
breath a force takes right before the fight turns.
Because
it turned.
Fresh
Confederate troops came over from Columbus and moved through the timber with a
goal every soldier understands: cut the enemy off from the boats. Dougherty
felt sure “the rebels were crossing immediately into Belmont or above it,” and
that the gunboats had to move “almost under some of the rebel guns” to help
cover the river.
The
Seventh Iowa ended up in the worst place a regiment can be in that kind of
moment—out front, deep enough to taste success, and then suddenly asked to claw
backward through additional pressure.
This
is where the Seventh Iowa earned its Belmont reputation.
Grant
told his superiors that “The Seventh Iowa… lost their colonel (Lauman), wounded
severely, and lieutenant-colonel (Wentz), killed, and major (Rice), severely
wounded.” He listed the dead and wounded by name—Lieutenants Dodge and Gardner
among the killed, Captains Gardner, Harper, and Parrott among the wounded—then
summed up what he’d seen: “Being on the field myself during the entire
engagement, I can answer for the gallantry of officers and men of both these
regiments.”
Lauman’s
report spelled out the cost in human detail. “I might go on in this way and
name nearly all my entire command, for they all behaved like heroes.” He
singled out men who stayed steady when it mattered, and then he reached down
into the mud and blood and pulled up a story that summed it all up. Private
Lawrence Trigg, he wrote, had his thigh broken and was left on the field, taken
prisoner, his leg amputated. Trigg “died the same day, telling his captors with
his dying breath that if he ever recovered to be able to move he would shoulder
his musket again in his country’s cause.”
That’s
not a battlefield speech. That’s a man talking through pain.
Not
every account came from the top. Captain Benjamin Crabb of Company H later
wrote a supplement to the reports, explaining what his skirmishers saw and
did.
His
company moved forward in a loose line, ran into Confederate skirmishers, and
pushed them hard. Then the trap snapped shut. Crabb said they drove the enemy
“into the open field of Belmont,” were about “80 yards in their rear,” and were
about to pursue when “the rebels… lying behind this ridge, arose and” opened on
them. It’s the oldest move in the book—bait and rise—and it still worked.
Crabb
also captured the gritty, pointless bravery that shows up when men don’t want
to leave anything behind. During the retreat, part of his company “drew one of
the enemy’s guns across the field” toward the timber, but “finding it
impossible to proceed with it farther… we reluctantly abandoned it.” Soon
after, Crabb himself was captured.
While
the infantry fought its way back, another detail shows how close the entire
operation came to disaster. Captain John B. Detrich, commanding a detachment
that included two companies of the Seventh Iowa, had orders to protect the
transports. He watched the fight, tried to read the sound and tempo of the
firing, and understood what it meant when the musketry suddenly became “very
rapid.” He wrote that from the sound he judged the Union troops had encountered
“fresh forces of the enemy, and were fighting their way back through them.”
Detrich
moved his men into position near the boats. Once the troops started
re-embarking, the Confederates pressed to the riverbank and began firing down
from the high ground. Detrich’s line about that moment is pure Belmont: the men
“spiritedly returned the fire of the rebels from the hurricane deck.” That’s
how close it got—new troops, jammed onto a steamer, firing from the decks while
the riverbank snapped with musket flashes.
In
the end, the Union force got away, protected by gunboats and stubbornness. The
Confederates held the field, but Grant came out of it more confident—and so did
the men who survived it. Grant argued afterward that the fight mattered because
it steadied his army. “The confidence inspired in our troops in the
engagement,” he said, “will be of incalculable benefit to us in the future.”
For
Iowa, the “benefit” came wrapped in grief. The Seventh Iowa took a savage hit.
The regiment’s leadership was shot up. The casualty lists were long enough to
change the way towns talked. Belmont wasn’t Shiloh or Vicksburg, but for
Burlington, Davenport, and the little Iowa communities that fed the Seventh, it
was the first time the war reached back through the newspaper columns and
grabbed people by the throat.
Colonel
Dougherty—an Illinois officer, writing about the Iowa men beside his own—said:
“Iowa may well feel proud of her sons who fought at Belmont.”
They
could be proud. They could also be angry at how fast it happened, how messy it
was, and how victory turned into a sprint for the river.
Belmont
taught Iowa troops that winning a camp doesn’t mean winning a battle, cheering
doesn’t stop bullets, and the river behind you isn’t scenery—it’s survival.
The
Seventh Iowa went into Belmont as a fresh regiment looking for its first fight.
It came out as a regiment people remembered.
No comments:
Post a Comment