| Steamboats at Pittsburg Landing |
One Iowa correspondent said the attack came “like a thunderclap out of a clear sky,” adding that men were driven from their tents “before they had time to seize their arms.” A reporter for the Chicago Tribune was blunter: “The enemy fell upon us with a fury that astonished even seasoned troops.”
Shiloh
wasn’t supposed to happen like that.
Union
commander Ulysses S. Grant believed his army was secure while it gathered for
an advance deeper into Tennessee. The camps were spread out. Men cooked
breakfast. Some were still half asleep when musket fire cracked through the
trees.
Grant
would later admit, “I did not expect an attack so soon,” a statement repeated
widely in Iowa papers in the weeks that followed.
The Confederates were closer than anyone realized.
For
Iowa troops, the battle began in confusion and smoke. Iowa had sent a large
force to Grant’s Army of the Tennessee. Infantry regiments from across the
state were present, along with artillery batteries that would soon fire almost
nonstop for two days.
Among
the Iowa infantry at Shiloh were the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 8th, 12th, 14th, 15th, and
16th Iowa. Many had already seen combat in Missouri or earlier operations in
Tennessee. They were not green, but nothing they had faced prepared them for
what came out of the woods that morning.
| A scene in the fighting at Shiloh |
The
2nd Iowa Infantry, commanded by Colonel James M. Tuttle, was among the first
Iowa units heavily engaged. Formed near the front of the Union camps, the
regiment was hit hard and early. They fell back under pressure, reformed, and
went forward again as Confederate attacks rolled across the field.
Grant
praised the regiment, writing in his official report that the 2nd Iowa “stood
its ground under a most destructive fire, and retired only when flanked on both
sides.”
Tuttle’s
men fought in open ground and broken timber, firing until cartridges ran low
and ranks thinned. An Iowa soldier recalled, “The smoke hung so thick that we
fired at sound rather than sight.”
Nearby,
the 6th Iowa Infantry under Colonel John Adair McDowell moved into position as
the line bent and shifted. McDowell was killed during the fighting, struck
while leading his men.
The Dubuque
Herald reported his death with grim clarity, writing that he “fell
while bravely urging his regiment forward, pierced by the enemy’s fire.” One
soldier from the regiment later said simply, “He died where a colonel ought to
die—at the front.”
His
death hit the regiment hard, but the 6th Iowa held its ground through repeated
attacks, refusing to collapse even as neighboring units gave way.
The
early hours of Shiloh were chaotic everywhere.
The
7th Iowa Infantry, part of a brigade commanded by Colonel Jacob G. Lauman, was
pushed into heavy fighting near the center of the field. Lauman later described
the situation as “confusion indescribable,” noting that “regiments were
compelled to fight almost independently, guided only by the sound of firing.”
The
7th Iowa was thrown forward, fell back, and advanced again. Men fought through
smoke so thick it was difficult to see more than a few yards. Orders were
shouted. Flags became rallying points.
A
correspondent for the New York Times observed that “whole
brigades seemed to dissolve into fragments, yet the men continued to fight on
with stubborn determination.”
Colonel
William T. Shaw’s 14th Iowa Infantry entered the fight late in the first day
but immediately found itself in the thick of it. Shaw’s men were positioned
near what would become known as the Hornet’s Nest, a sunken road where Union
troops made a prolonged stand. This stretch of ground became one of the
bloodiest places on the field.
A
soldier from the 14th Iowa wrote home that “the air was alive with bullets,”
adding that the sound “was like tearing canvas held close to the ear.”
The
Hornet’s Nest earned its name honestly. Confederate attacks poured in for
hours, met by steady musket fire from behind the road embankment. Iowa
regiments were part of that stubborn defense, holding while the sound of
bullets snapping overhead never seemed to stop.
The
12th Iowa Infantry, commanded by Colonel Joseph J. Woods, also fought in this
sector. Like many units in the Hornet’s Nest, the 12th Iowa endured repeated
assaults. When the Confederates finally concentrated artillery and infantry
against the position late in the afternoon, portions of the line were
surrounded.
Colonel
Woods said his men fought until “every cartridge was exhausted.” An Iowa paper
described the surrender as “a bitter necessity, not a failure of courage.” It
was one of the darkest moments of the day.
Further
to the right, the 8th Iowa Infantry under Colonel James L. Geddes fought in
conditions just as desperate. Geddes was wounded during the battle. His
regiment lost heavily but continued to hold until ordered to withdraw.
Geddes
later wrote, “My regiment behaved with great gallantry, and did not leave the
field until compelled by overwhelming force.”
| General Ulysses S. Grant |
An
artillerist said that “horses fell in heaps about the guns,” and that men
“worked the pieces with the steadiness of a drill, though death was at every
discharge.”
Artillery
fire helped slow Confederate advances and bought time for Union infantry to
reform. By nightfall on April 6, the Union army had been driven back toward the
river.
Grant
refused to retreat. When advised to pull back, he replied, according to one
officer, “We will lick them tomorrow.”
Iowa
regiments that had been fighting since dawn slept—or tried to—on muddy ground
under rain, surrounded by wounded men and the sounds of a battlefield that
never fully quieted.
A
soldier wrote home that night, “We lay down with the rain on our faces and the
dead at our feet.”
On
the morning of April 7, the Iowa infantry moved forward with the rest of
Grant’s army. The fighting was still fierce, but the balance had shifted.
The
15th Iowa Infantry, commanded by Colonel Hugh T. Reid, took part in the
advance, helping push Confederate forces back through the same woods and fields
that had swallowed the Union camps the day before.
The
16th Iowa Infantry under Colonel Alexander Chambers moved forward. Chambers
said his men “advanced with confidence, driving the enemy at every point where
we encountered him.”
By
afternoon, the Confederate army began its retreat. Grant later summarized the
result simply: “The enemy was driven from the field in confusion.”
Shiloh
was over, but the cost was staggering.
Iowa
regiments suffered heavily in killed, wounded, and missing. The Iowa
State Register called Shiloh “a victory baptized in blood,” noting
that nearly every town in the state would soon receive grim letters.
Grant
later wrote that Shiloh taught him the war would not be quick or easy.
Iowa
soldiers already knew that. They had learned it in the woods along the
Tennessee River, where camps became battlefields and breakfast fires turned
into lines of fire.
Shiloh
didn’t end the war in the West, but it changed it. The Mississippi Valley would
not fall easily. Neither side would break quickly.
An
Iowa private put it plainly in a letter printed back home: “We have found out
what war truly is.”
Shiloh
was not a clean victory. It was not a simple story. But in the chaos and
violence of one of the war’s first great battles, Iowa regiments proved they
could stand in the worst conditions the war offered.
And
at Shiloh, Iowa held.
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